Lama-receiving countries, there is some evidence that trade intermediaries even benefit. Overall, we find the effects to be much more short-lived than previously thought.
INTRODUCTION
Politics and trade are intertwined. The linkages between bilateral political and commercial relations have received considerable attention in the literature (e.g., Pollins 1989a,b; Gowa and Mansfield 1993; Michaels and Zhi 2010; Berger et al. 2013; Mityakov et al. 2013; Che et al. 2015) . While there are arguments as to why political relations should play a smaller role in an increasingly globalized world (Davis and Meunier 2011) , the state of political relations appears to remain pivotal in commercial relationships with states that have a relatively high level of state control over economic activities (Davis et al. 2016) . There is also growing empirical evidence demonstrating the salience of political consumerism, i.e., consumers changing their decisions as a result of worsening bilateral political relations (Antoniades and Clerides 2015; Heilman 2016; Fouka and Voth 2016; Pandya and Venkatesan 2016) . Still, little is known about the firm-level dynamics driving trade reductions during times of heightened political tensions between trade partner countries.
1
The travel pattern of the 14 th Dalai Lama, a religious leader of Tibetan Buddhism and former political leader of Tibetans in exile, presents a particularly suitable case to study importers' response to non-militarized political tensions.
2 His meetings with government members and other foreign dignitaries across the globe are usually accompanied with diplomatic tensions between China and the countries receiving him. The Chinese government interprets receptions of the Dalai Lama by foreign dignitaries as interferences into its internal affairs. Before each visit of the Dalai Lama, China warns the prospective host countries that it will respond to such meetings with a deterioration of bilateral relations and often threatens to weaken trade ties. Fuchs and Klann (2013) study whether these threats are actually carried out: they find that during the 2002-2008 period (1) countries officially receiving yearly data used in Fuchs and Klann (2013) , monthly trade data allow us to investigate whether importers respond differently during different stages before and after meetings at even shorter periods of time. 5 We use transaction-level trade data by China Customs rather than data sourced from UN Comtrade or the IMF Directory of Trade Statistics to be able to compute the extensive and intensive trade margins and to disaggregate trade by firm-ownership type and trade mode. Our study focuses on
Chinese imports of machinery and transport equipment, the only sector identified by Fuchs and Klann (2013) as robustly suffering from a temporary reduction in trade in the aftermath of foreign dignitaries' official receptions of the Dalai Lama. A thorough investigation of the firm-level dynamics at play will improve our understanding of the politics-trade nexus.
We argue that Chinese importers face a trade-off between bearing the costs from sanctioning firms of Dalai Lama-receiving countries and those from not sanctioning such firms. On the one hand, it is obvious that compliant importers face significant costs. They need to substitute their imports with the same or similar products from a domestic company or a foreign supplier based in a country whose government has not recently received the Dalai Lama. Such substitutes are likely to be more costly and/or of inferior quality. Even if this is not the case, the establishment of a new trading relationship itself is costly. Alternatively, the firm may be forced to postpone its imports until the political tensions have been relieved. On the other hand, costs from not sanctioning firms from Dalai Lama-receiving countries can be imposed by the Chinese government. For example, the government can cut subsidies to non-compliant firms or disadvantage these firms when awarding government contracts. Moreover, career prospects within the government or the Communist party may incentivize a firm's leadership to carry out sanctions against firms of Dalai Lama-receiving countries. It is important to note that our line of reasoning does not require that the government formally announces measures against or actually imposes costs on not-sanctioning firms; it is sufficient that the firm's leadership believes that it may suffer disadvantages in the future and thus acts preemptively.
6
This article analyzes whether importers' trade-off between the costs from sanctioning and those from not sanctioning Dalai Lama-receiving countries are reflected in import decisions along three dimensions. First, we relate to the literature on firm heterogeneity and trade (e.g., Bernard et al. 1995 Bernard and Jensen 1999; Melitz 2003; Chaney 2008; Helpman et al. 2008; Lawless 2010) . Breaking down imports into the average import value of those Chinese firms that are active as importers
Chinese trade from China Customs are increasingly used in the economics literature (e.g., Cai and Liu 2009; Ahn et al. 2011; Brandt et al. 2012; Manova and Zhang 2012; Tang and Zhang 2012; Feenstra et al. 2014; Bas and Strauss-Kahn 2015; Fan et al. 2015; Yu 2015) . 5 Du et al. (2014) highlight the importance of analyzing trade data at a higher frequency than the usually employed annual data. 6 It is also worth adding that the same effect can occur if the firm's leadership believes that they will benefit from carrying out a retaliation promised by the government rather than being punished for not doing it. For example, the company's leadership could believe that it will be more likely receive positions in the government or that the firm will be favored through subsidies or government contracts.
(firm-level intensive margin) and the number of Chinese importers buying in the market (firm-level extensive margin), we expect to observe import reductions caused by Dalai Lama meetings mainly at the intensive margin of trade. Firms that want to accommodate the Chinese government should prefer to adjust imports at the intensive margin to avoid the additional fixed costs they would incur from setting up new trade relations. Establishing new trade relationships would incur search costs (e.g., Besedeš 2008 ) and these appear avoidable given the expected temporary nature of the tensions.
Second, we expect firms of different ownership types to respond differently to political tensions due to their varying degrees of political proximity to the government (Che 2002; Brandt and Li 2003; Li et al. 2008; Lu 2011; Qin 2012) . Davis et al. (2016) find Chinese (and Indian) imports through state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to be more responsive to bilateral political relations compared to those through private firms. When China's administration threatens to sanction trading partners in response to official receptions of the Dalai Lama, we expect that these threats are more likely to be carried out by firms with strong ties to the government, which is the case for SOEs by their very definition, but also foreign-invested firms that are relatively more dependent on the Chinese government than private firms (Huang 2004 ).
Third, we follow the literature on the importance of different trade modes in China (e.g., Feenstra
and Wei 2010). Trade intermediaries are found to show different trade behaviors when compared to direct traders (Ahn et al. 2011; Antràs and Costinot 2011; Lu et al. 2011; Head et al. 2014; Bernard et al. 2015) . Following the logic of Ahn et al. (2011) , political tensions, such as those caused by Dalai Lama meetings, should show up predominantly as decreases in imports by direct traders as they cannot cope with the additional costs of circumventing the import restrictions imposed by government action.
7 Trade intermediaries in turn should possess the know-how to circumvent such restrictions and may even benefit from firms replacing direct imports with indirect imports sourced through them. By analyzing the differences in direct importers' and trade intermediaries' responses to political tensions caused by the Dalai Lama meetings, we can learn how the firm-level response to political tensions depends on the mode of trade.
Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, the import-dampening effect of Dalai Lama meetings operates at the intensive margin (i.e., a decrease in the import value by importer). Second, we mainly find significant reductions in trade values for SOEs and-to a smaller extent-for foreign-invested firms, but no such relationship for private firms. Third, we find the 'Dalai Lama Effect' to be driven by reductions of trade through direct importers, while trade intermediaries-if anything-appear to benefit. We also find that the effect predominantly takes place in the second quarter after the meeting and then disappears. As such, the retaliation is much more short-lived than previously thought. These findings are thus in line with the idea that Chinese importers face a trade-off between bearing costs from suboptimal trade transactions and costs from not accommodating the government.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the estimation method and the data used to analyze how importing firms respond to political tensions. Sections 3-5 present the empirical results and discuss their implications. In Section 6, we provide several tests of robustness and account for the potential endogeneity of meetings with the Dalai Lama using an instrumental-variables strategy based on Fuchs and Klann (2013) . Finally, Section 7 summarizes the findings and concludes the paper.
DATA AND METHOD

Dependent variable
We obtain monthly trade data from China Customs. This dataset covers the monthly transactions of every Chinese trading firm by partner country together with information on the name of the firm, its ownership type, and trade mode. While it would be desirable to analyze a longer period of time, we are limited to the 2000-2006 period due to data availability. However, our time period shows a big overlap with the "Hu Jintao era" sample (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) in Fuchs and Klann (2013) for which a significant Dalai Lama effect is observed and should thus be suitable for our purposes. As outlined above, we focus on the imports of machinery and transport equipment as defined in the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC 7).
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In order to study the effect of official receptions of the Dalai Lama on the extensive and intensive margins of China's imports from other countries, we compute monthly values of these two margins at the country level. Specifically, the extensive margin is represented by the number of Chinese firms ܰ ௧ importing from partner country ݅ at time ‫.ݐ‬ The intensive margin is represented by the average value of imports per importer ‫ݔ‬ ప௧ തതതത = ே from partner country ݅ at time ‫.ݐ‬ Therefore, the overall value of imports ܺ ௧ is the product of these two margins, i.e., ܺ ௧ = ‫ݔ‬ ప௧ തതതത • ܰ ௧ . China Customs collects data on importers' ownership type which allows us to compute both margins of imports separately for state-owned, foreign-invested and private companies. 9 We further construct both margins of imports by trade mode, splitting firms into trade intermediaries and direct traders. Specifically, we follow Ahn et al. (2011) and identify trade intermediaries as those firms whose names contain Chinese characters with the English-equivalent meaning of "importer,"
"exporter," and/or "trading." Firms typically still follow a pre-reform naming convention when central planners favored descriptive company names (Ahn et al. 2011) . By applying this procedure, 14.7 percent of firms can be identified as trade intermediaries. Analogously, we define direct traders as firms whose names do not contain Chinese characters with the English-equivalent meaning of "importer," "exporter," and/or "trading."
To illustrate our coding of firms, Figure 3 presents the corresponding world map. The table also lists the number of visits the Dalai Lama has paid to each country as well as the total length of his stay. As can be seen, the country whose government members have most often received the Tibetan leader during the time period under examination is India (7 times), followed by the United States (5), the Czech Republic, and Italy (both 3). The most important travel destinations of the Dalai Lama have been India (69 visits, corresponding to a total of 593 days), 11 followed by Japan (13, 57), the United States (10, 136), and Germany (10, 40).
Regression model
In order to estimate the effect of receptions of the Dalai Lama on Chinese imports, we take the augmented gravity model of international trade as our starting point. The gravity model is considered the workhorse for econometric analyses of trade flows. It assumes that bilateral trade is proportional to the product of the trading partners' economic masses, proxied by GDP, and inversely proportional to the geographic distance between them. In order to control for unobserved country heterogeneity, we make use of partner-country fixed effects. The effect of bilateral distance and other time-invariant factors, such as being landlocked, being an island state, sharing a border and sharing an official language with the partner country, are thus captured by these fixed effects. Moreover, we control for time-specific factors by including binary variables for each time period t. We run regressions for total imports and the two margins of trade separately. Since we estimate our model in logarithms, the sum of the logged margins equals the log of the aggregate bilateral imports. We run the following three econometric models:
where ‫ܲܦܩ‬ ௧ and ‫‬ ௧ indicate the partner country's GDP and population size, respectively; ߛ ௧ and ߜ are time-and country-fixed effects; ߬ ‫ݐ‬ are country-specific linear time trends; and ߝ ௧ is a stochastic error. 12 We cluster standard errors at the country level.
Our variables of interest ݈݀ܽܽ݅(ܳ − ‫)ݏ‬ ௧ are a series of binary variables that take a value of one if the Dalai Lama was received by a government member in the partner country in the previous four quarters, ܳ − 4, … , ܳ − 1, respectively.
13 Appendix A3 provides summary statistics for variables used in our analysis.
In order to investigate the role of firm ownership type, we also estimate Equations (1) and (2) separately for state-owned, privately-owned, and foreign-invested companies. Finally, we show separate results for direct traders and trade intermediaries in order to analyze differences across trade modes. Table 3 presents our results when estimating Equations (1) to (3) Since GDP and population data are not available at a monthly or quarterly frequency for developing countries, we use annual values for all countries for consistency. Data have been obtained from the CEPII Gravity dataset (Head et al. 2010) , which mainly draws on the World Bank's World Development Indicators.
MAIN ANALYSIS: MARGINS OF TRADE
13 More precisely, we compute the following binary variables: ݈݀ܽܽ݅(ܳ − 1) ௧ takes a value of 1 in the case of a Dalai Lama meeting having taken place in the previous month, two months ago, or three months ago (i.e., in the quarter after the meeting), ݈݀ܽܽ݅(ܳ − 2) ௧ takes a value of 1 in the case of a Dalai Lama meeting having taken place four months ago, five months ago, or six months ago (i.e., in the 2nd quarter after the meeting), ݈݀ܽܽ݅(ܳ − 3) ௧ takes a value of 1 in the case of a Dalai Lama meeting having taken place seven months ago, eight months ago, or nine months ago (i.e., in the 3rd quarter after the meeting), and ݈݀ܽܽ݅(ܳ − 4) ௧ takes a value of 1 in the case of a Dalai Lama meeting having taken place ten months ago, eleven months ago, or twelve months ago (i.e., in the 4th quarter after the meeting).
earlier or later meetings do not reach statistical significance at conventional levels. This is in line with evidence in Fuchs and Klann (2013) according to which the Dalai Lama Effect is only temporary in nature, but the time window for trade retaliation appears to be narrower than suggested by their analysis based on annual data.
Interpreting the quantitative size of the effect, the monthly import value of machinery and transport equipment per firm is reduced by 30.0 percent on average during the second quarter following a meeting. 14 Incorporating the coefficients for the other three dummies indicating a Dalai Lama meeting over the last year, we obtain an annual reduction of per-firm import values of 10.8
percent. This is a more reasonable estimate of the annual Dalai Lama Effect in terms of machinery and transport equipment than the 45.4 percent suggested in the results of Fuchs and Klann (2013) based on annual data. Using monthly data, we thus find the effects of political shocks on trade to be smaller and more short-lived compared to those found using annual data. This supports Du et al. (2014) who point out that the use of low-frequency data introduces an aggregation bias since the cycle of such moderate political shocks is much shorter.
Our findings are very similar when we treat missing values as zero trade flows and add a value of 1 to our dependent variable before taking logarithms (see columns 4-6 for comparison). The number of observations roughly doubles to 13,893 and the size of the Dalai Lama Effect at the intensive margin, albeit now only statistically significant at the ten-percent level, increases: the monthly import value of machinery and transport equipment per firm is reduced by 31.8 percent on average during the second quarter following a meeting (column 6).
In columns 7-9, we also add binary variables indicating whether a Dalai Lama meeting will take place in the upcoming two quarters, Q+1 and Q+2, to investigate anticipation effects of official receptions of the Dalai Lama, which mainly serve as a placebo test. 15 In line with expectations, Dalai
Lama meetings that will take place in the future do not appear to harm trade as shown by the insignificant coefficients on Dalai Lama meeting (Q+1) and Dalai Lama meeting (Q+2). This is expected as meetings are usually only announced at very short notice (Fuchs and Klann 2013) .
Turning to the interpretation of the results for the control variables, GDP and population do not reach statistical significance at conventional levels in most regressions, with two exceptions each.
These weak results for these control variables are not surprising in a sample of seven years since most of the variation in these variables should already be captured by the country-fixed effects and the country-specific linear time trend.
14 exp(-.356)-1. 15 The variable ݈݀ܽܽ݅(ܳ + 2) ௧ takes a value of 1 in the case that a Dalai Lama meeting will occur five months later, four months later, or three months later (i.e., if the meeting is to occur in the next quarter); ݈݀ܽܽ݅(ܳ + 1) ௧ takes a value of 1 in the case that a Dalai Lama meeting will take place two months later, one month later, or in the current month (i.e., if the meeting is to occur in the current quarter).
Summing up, our empirical analysis suggests that the trade-reducing impact of Dalai Lama meetings operates at the intensive margin (and not at the extensive margin) and that this effect is visible only in the second quarter after the encounter. The different findings for the two margins of trade suggests that firms follow a strategy that recognizes government interests while protecting their own; trade volume is reduced but the resulting adverse effects are mitigated at the firm level. By adjusting their imports at the intensive margin, firms avoid the fixed costs they would incur from setting up new trade relations, while at the same time accommodating the government to a certain extent. Establishing new trade relationships would cause search costs (e.g., Besedeš 2008) and these appear avoidable given the expected temporary nature of the tensions.
THE ROLE OF FIRM OWNERSHIP TYPE
Differences in the Chinese government's treatment of firms across ownership types could affect importers' reactions to political tensions with foreign governments. According to Huang (2004) , the Chinese government follows a political pecking order. It attaches the highest priority to SOEs, followed by foreign-invested firms, while domestic wholly private firms take the last position in this ranking. This describes the government's treatment of firms depending on their ownership type, which is played out in its economic policies, regulatory practices, and financial support.
With respect to SOEs, Davis et al. (2016) identify three pathways that make these firms more likely to politicize trading decisions than private companies. First, they invoke SOEs' service to their given objective of advancing the goals of the state: profit considerations are of secondary importance. Such dependencies should make firms of different ownership types behave differently according to their political closeness to the government. In line with this reasoning, we argue that firms' responses to political tensions, such as those caused by Dalai Lama meetings, are a function of their closeness to the government. Specifically, we expect SOEs to most closely follow the government's interests as they are most dependent on the government. SOEs should exhibit the strongest reaction to tensions; they keep pace with government's demands or even proactively take retaliations without explicit government demands. On the contrary, we expect private companies to display the least compliance with government interests during political tensions due to their comparatively weak political connections and relative lack of dependence on the government.
16 Finally, the behavior of foreign-invested firms should be in-between the behavior of private and state-owned companies as their dependence on the government is between the two, i.e., they should reduce their imports by more than private firms but less than SOEs.
Since the baseline results in Table 3 only showed a significant trade reduction at the intensive margin, we focus on Equation 3 in the following.
17 Table 4 when in China, do as the Chinese do.
16 Our argument is a relative one. Of course, Chinese private enterprises are also dependent on the government-but to a smaller extent. Unfortunately, we are not able to separate the trade response of private companies led by members of the Communist Party of China from those companies led by party outsiders.
Research has found membership in the Communist party to be beneficial for the performance of private firms (e.g., Li et al. 2008) . 17 The interested reader will find the corresponding regression tables for total trade (Equation 1) in Appendix A4 and for the extensive margin (Equation 2) in Appendix A5. Note that the Dalai Lama Effect becomes negative and statistically significant at the five-percent level for private firms in the second and third quarter after the meeting according to column 5 of Appendix A5. However, this finding is not robust to changes in the treatment of missing values in our dependent variable (see column 2).
THE ROLE OF TRADE MODES
We also expect differences in countries' responsiveness to political tensions between direct importers and pure traders. In the framework of Ahn et al. (2011) , firms choose whether to trade directly or through trade intermediaries. If they opt for the latter, they only incur a global fixed costs rather than fixed costs specific to each trade partner. For completeness, we also examine again the extensive margin of trade. In line with our results in Table 3 , we do not find significant effects of Dalai Lama meetings on the extensive margin of trade when we split import transactions by trade mode, while the results for total trade largely reflect our findings at the intensive margin (see Appendices A6 and A7 for full regression results).
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
We take several steps to test the robustness of our baseline results (reprinted in column 1 of Table 6 as instruments: the likelihood that a government member meets the Dalai Lama is expected to be larger when the Dalai Lama is present in the country, the longer his visit lasts as this increases the amount of media attention he receives, and the more Tibet Support Groups that are active in the partner country and this increases their ability to lobby for a Dalai Lama meeting.
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Column 5 of Table 6 presents the results of our 2SLS approach. The Angrist-Pischke test of excluded instruments underlines the relevance of the instruments selected in the first stage. The corresponding F statistic is above the critical rule of thumb value of 10 (Staiger and Stock 1997) . Tests for overidentification (Hansen J) and underidentification (Kleinbergen Paap LM test) also provide evidence in favor of our instruments. The coefficient on Dalai Lama meeting (Q-2) is negative as expected but fails to reach statistical significance at the ten-percent level (p-value: 0.160). However, this is not worrisome for our conclusions as these should be drawn from the results of the most efficient estimators. The test for endogeneity does not reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the Dalai Lama dummies. Note that 2SLS is less efficient if the variable of interest is not endogenous (Wooldridge 2002) . Since this is the case with the Dalai Lama dummy, we treat the OLS fixed-effects results reported above as our preferred specification.
Fifth, we account for the different ranks of dignitaries who meet with the Dalai Lama. To this end, Table 7 shows the results from regressions where we include four binary variables covering an increasingly broader group of dignitaries meeting with the Tibetan leader (columns 1-4). Our contribution to the literature is fourfold. First, using monthly trade information, we enhanced the understanding of the timing of importer response to non-militarized political tensions. We found that the temporary reduction of Chinese imports takes place mainly during the second quarter following a country's government member's official reception of the Dalai Lama. Second, we analyzed whether the trade-dampening effect works through a decrease in the number of importers (extensive margin) or via a fall in the trade volume per importer (intensive margin). Our results showed that the import-dampening effect operates predominantly at the intensive margin, suggesting that firms avoid disrupting their trade relations but want to accommodate the Chinese government to a certain extent. Third, we investigated differences between state-owned, private, and foreign-invested firms. Our results showed that the effect operates mainly through SOEs and to a lesser extent through foreign-invested firms, which are both more dependent on the government than private entities. Fourth, we examined differences between direct importers and trade intermediaries. While import decisions of direct importers appeared to be adversely affected, we found-if anything-a positive effect on trade intermediaries. The latter seem to benefit from such tensions as they are better placed to cope with and even capitalize on adverse circumstances. Our results hold when we restricted the sample to European Union countries, included the Dalai Lama's host country India, and varied the definition of an official reception.
Our findings highlight that political tensions do not uniformly affect trade relationships. Whether and to what degree political tension translates into trade losses depends on the firm type. Firms face a trade-off between bearing the costs from sanctioning firms of Dalai Lama-receiving countries, which which are imposed by the government. Our study thus also speaks to the literature on why autocracies trade less (Mansfield et al. 2000; Aidt and Gassebner 2010) , by analyzing why and how an autocratic government creates trade-distorting red tape. Beyond the academic interest in achieving a better understanding of the politics-trade nexus, our results also contain important policy implications for trading firms. Importers may heed these results and seek to mitigate the costs of any anticipated bilateral tension by increasing their stock holdings. Additionally, a better understanding of the potential trade consequences of provoking the Chinese government is also key for many governments around the globe as China, already the 'workbench of the world,' strives to become the world's economic and political center. India  7  7  69  593  Ireland  1  1  0  0  Israel  0  1  1  5  Italy  3  4  10  33  Japan  0  0  13  57  Jordan  2  3  2  10  Latvia  1  1  1  3  Lithuania  1  1  1  5  Luxembourg  0  0  1  2  Mexico  1  1  1  6  Mongolia  1  1  2  13  New Zealand  1  1  1  5  Norway  2  2  3  13  Peru  1  2  1  4  Poland  1  1  1  4  Portugal  1  1  1  6  Puerto Rico  0  1  1  3  Russia  0  1  2  3  The Netherlands  0  0  1  2  Slovakia  0  0  1  3  Slovenia  1  1  1  3  Spain  0  0  1  4  South Africa  0  2  1  7  Sweden  1  2  3  11  Switzerland  2  2  3  18  UK  1  1  4  20  USA  5  9  10  136 Note: "Meetings with government members" lists the number of official receptions of the Dalai Lama by political leaders or government members. "Meetings with all dignitaries" lists the number of receptions by any dignitary covered by the database. "Number of visits" is the total number of visits of the Dalai Lama to each country. "Number of days" denotes the total number of days stayed during all visits in each country.
24 Table 3 : The Dalai Lama Effect at the extensive margin and intensive margin Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the country level (in parentheses). * (**, ***) indicates statistical significance at the ten-percent (five-percent, one-percent) level. statistical significance at the ten-percent (five-percent, one-percent) level. Column 5 uses nine instrumental variables: binary variables that take a value of one if the Dalai Lama was traveling to a partner country in the previous four quarters, Q-4,...,Q-1, respectively, the number of days that the Tibetan leader spends in a partner country in the previous four quarters, Q-4,...,Q-1, respectively, and the number of Tibet Support Groups (TSG) in a partner country. 
